The aim of this paper is to establish general existence results of maximal elements for L L-majorized mappings, which are, in turn, used to establish the Ž general existence theorems of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract . economics without lower semicontinuity for both constraint and preference map-Ž . Ž . pings correspondences and in which strategic resp., commodity spaces may not Ž . be compact, the set of players resp., agents may not be countable, and underlying spaces are either finite or infinite dimensional locally topological vector spaces. Our results unify or improve corresponding results in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
Since the existence of equilibria in an abstract economy with compact n w x strategy sets in ‫ޒ‬ was proved in a seminal paper of Debreu 4 which is classical Arrow᎐Debreu᎐McKenzie model of exchange economies under perfect information competition, there have been many generalizations of w x w x Debreu's theorem by Aliprantis Zhou 26 , and many others. Even several different kinds of mappings have been Ž Ž . . introduced such as class of L resp., L*, L L , L L X, Y, , L -majorized
.Ž w x w x w x w x resp., L*, L L , L L X, Y, -majorized e.g., see 5 , 15 , 18 , 22 , and . others , and a number of existence theorems of equilibria for generalized Ž . games resp., abstract economics have been established; however, note that almost all of those results so far established in the literature need some assumptions such as either preference mappings or constraint map-Ž . pings are lower semicontinuous, or the set of players resp., agents is Ž . countable and strategic resp., commodity spaces need to be compact. On the other hand, in order to allow people to study general equilibrium problems involving infinite time horizons, we need to study general exis-Ž tence problems of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract eco-. Ž . nomics in which the strategic resp., commodity spaces are infinitely Ž dimensional, and the set of players resp., agents, or states of world, or . varieties of commodity characteristics is infinite and even uncountable. Moreover we do know that there exist many constraint mappings which are only upper semicontinuous instead of having lower semicontinuity and also there do exist preference mappings which do not have lower semicontinu-Ž w x w x w x . ity e.g., see 1 , 2 , 21 , and related references therein . Motivated by those facts, by using approximate techniques for upper semicontinuous set-valued mappings in locally topological vector spaces, the purpose of this paper is to establish general existence results of maximal elements for L L-majorized mappings, which are, in turn, used to establish the general Ž existence theorems of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract . economics without lower semicontinuity for both constraint and prefer-Ž . Ž ence mappings correspondences and in which strategic resp., commod-. Ž . ity spaces may not be compact, the set of players resp., agents may not be countable, and underlying spaces are either finite or infinite dimensional locally topological vector spaces. Our results unify or improve corresponding results in the literature.
In order to expose clearly the idea and method we used in this paper, we only focus on the study of so-called L L-majorized mappings which have been used and discussed extensively in mathematical economics in the last more than two decades, though the method used in this paper might be applicable for a more broad class of mappings such as, for example, KF w x mappings discussed by Yuan and Tarafdar 24 and others. Now we recall or introduce some notions and definitions. Throughout this paper, all topological spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff unless otherwise specified. Let A be a subset of a topological space X. We 
called the adherence of the graph of T , and cl T :
In this paper, by using the so-called approximate method which has been w x initially used by Tan and Yuan 15 , we will focus on the study of generalized games in which the preference mappings are so-called L Lmajorized mappings, whose roots could be found from Borglin and Keidw x w x Ž ing's paper 3 and Yannelis and Prabhakar 22 for more recent studies, w x w x w x w x . see 17 , 18 , 5 , 15 , and references therein . By following the idea of w x Yannelis and Prabhakar 22 , we first have the notion of L L-majorized mappings as follows. Let X be a topological space, let Y be a nonempty Ž . subset of a vector space E, let : X ª E be a single-valued mapping, and let : X ª 2 Y be a correspondence. Then we have that:
. and x f co x and b for each y g Y,
y is compactly open in X;
Ž . an open neighborhood of x in X such that a for each z g N , z ;
We note that our notions of the mapping P being of class L L and 
. A generalized game resp., abstract economy is a family of quadruples ⌫ s X ; A , B ; P , Ž .
where I is a possibly uncountable set of players resp., agents such that, for each i g I, X is a nonempty subset of a topological vector space and i A , B : X s ⌸ X ª 2 X i are constraint correspondences and P : X ª
is also called an N-person game.
An equilibrium of ⌫ is a point x g X such that, for each i g I, 
THE EXISTENCE OF SELECTIONS FOR L L-MAJORIZED MAPPINGS
In this section, we first have the following existence of L L-class mappings for L L-majorized mappings in topological vector spaces. neighborhood of x in X and let : X ª 2 Y be a set-valued mapping such 
Ž .
x Xx Ž X . y1 Ž . It follows that, for each nonempty compact subset C of X, y l
Ž . Therefore z f co z for all z g X. Now we show that, for each
y / л and let C be a compact subset of X; fix an arbitrary y1 Ž .
y is compactly open in X. Thus is of class L L and the proof is complete.
Ž .
Condition C . Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space E. Throughout this paper, a set-valued mapping P: X ª 2 X is said to satisfy the following noncompact condition: If there exist a Ž nonempty compact and convex subset X and a nonempty compact not 0 . necessarily convex subset K of X such that, for each y g X _ K, we have Ž . Ž Ä 4. that co P y l co X j y / л. 0 To establish the existence of maximal elements, we first have the following generalization of the Fan᎐Browder fixed point theorem which is, w x indeed, Lemma 1 of Ding and Tan 5, p. 228 . For the convenience of readers, we give the outline of its proof as applications of Fan's geometric w x lemma in 8 which is an infinite dimensional version of the famous KKM w x principle in 13 . . nonempty compact not necessarily con¨ex subset K of X such that, for each
Proof. Suppose the conclusion were false. Then, for each x g X, we
Then F x is nonempty and convex y1 Ž . for each x g X. By our assumption, it is easy to verify that F y is
By the noncompact condition, there exists a nonempty compact convex subset X of X and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for
for each x g X. We shall prove that the family T x : x g X has the Ä 4 finite interaction property. Let x , . . . , x be any nonempty finite subset
Then D is also compact and convex 0 1 n and define T :
can also show that T is a KKM mapping; i.e., the convex hull of each
w x Ž D T u . Now by Lemma 1 of Fan 8 as we note that the assumption
Then we have that y must be inx
'' x f co G x for all x g X '' is impossible and the conclusion must hold;
Ž . i.e., there exists at least one x g X such that x g co G x .
As applications of both Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we have the following existence of maximal elements for L L-majorized mappings in topological vector spaces which will play the most important role in the study of general existence of equilibria for generalized games throughout this paper. THEOREM 2.3. Let X be a nonempty paracompact con¨ex subset of a topological¨ector space. Suppose the mapping P: X ª 2 X is L L-majorized Ž . Ž . and satisfies Condition C . Then there exists an x g K such that P x s л;î .e., x is a maximal element of P.
Proof. Suppose that the conclusion does not hold, then P x / л for all x g X and dom P s X is paracompact. By Theorem 2.1, there exists an
y is compactly open in X Ž . for all y g X. Note that P satisfies Condition C , so does . Therefore the mapping satisfies all hypotheses of Theorem 2.2. By Theorem 2.2, Ž . there exists a point x g X such that x g co x , which is a contradiction.
Ž . Thus there must exist x g X such that P x s л. By the noncompact 0 0
Ž . Condition C , it follows that x must be in K.
THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA FOR GENERALIZED GAMES WITHOUT LOWER SEMICONTINUITY FOR CONSTRAINT MAPPINGS
w x To apply the approximate method initially used by Tan and Yuan 15 Ž w x. see also 18 , we first recall some definitions and some results about approximation for upper semicontinuous set-valued mappings, due to w x Tulcea 18 .
Let X be a subset of a topological vector space E. By following Tulcea w x Ž . 18 , the set X is said to have the property K if, for every compact subset B of X, the convex hull co B is relatively compact in E. It is clear that Ž . each compact convex set in a Hausdorff resp., locally topological vector Ž . space always has property K . Let X and Y be two topological spaces and let F: X ª 2 Y be a set-valued mapping. Then the mapping F is said to be Ž . compact if, for any x g X, there exists an open neighborhood N x such
Let X be a nonempty set, let Y be a nonempty subset of a topological V g B B, where B B is a base for the zero
x, V Ž . Ž . From 1 ᎐ 3 , it is easy to deduce that:
a it has open lower sections, i.e., F y is open in X for each y g Y;
Ž . b F x is nonempty and convex for each x g X; 
iii
Now we shall first establish the following existence for equilibria for a so-called one-person game.
Ž
. THEOREM 3.2. Let X, F, G, P be a one-person game and strategic set X a nonempty paracompact con¨ex subset of a Hausdorff locally topological ector space such that
y is compactly open in X for each y g X;
Ž .
ii the preference mapping P is such that F l P is L L-majorized;
iii there exist a nonempty compact con¨ex subset X of X and a 0 nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, we ha¨e that
Ž . Ž . Then there exists a point x g K such that x g G x and F x l P x s л.ˆˆˆÄ
Ž . X Ž . X and a mapping : X ª 2 such that a z s F z l P z ; z x x Ž X Ž .. Ž . and z f co z for each z g N and b for each y g X, the set
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Note that 1 for each z g N , clearly ⌿ z ; ⌽ z and z f co ⌽ z ,
compactly open in X. Hence ⌽ is an L L-majorant of ⌿ at the point x in x Ž . X. Therefore ⌿ is an L L-majorized mapping. Moreover by condition iii , Ž Ä 4. Ž Ž . Ž .. for each x g X _ K, there exists y g co X j x l co F x l P x such 0 Ž Ž . Ž .. Ž . that y g co F x l P x ; co ⌿ x . By the paracompact assumption of X and the existence of maximal elements for L L-majorized mappings in topological vector spaces, e.g., Theorem 2.3 above, it follows that there Ž . Ž . exists x g K such that ⌿ x s л. As F x / л for all x g X, it followŝˆŽ . Ž . Ž . we must have that x f M, i.e., x g G x and F x l P x s л. Thiŝˆˆˆĉ ompletes the proof of Theorem 3.2. Now as applications of Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we have the following existence theorem of equilibria for a one-person game in which the constraint correspondences are only upper semicontinuous. THEOREM 3.3. Let the strategic set X be a nonempty paracompact closed Ž . and con¨ex with property K in a Hausdorff locally topological¨ector space and let F, P: X ª 2 X be two set-¨alued mappings such that Ž .
i the constraint mapping F is compact and upper semicontinuous with nonempty compact and con¨ex¨alues;
ii the preference mapping P is L L-majorized;
iii the domain of the mapping F l P is open in X, i.e, the set
iv there exist a nonempty compact con¨ex subset X of X and a 0 nonempty compact subset of K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, we ha¨e
Ž . Ž . Then there exists a point x g K such that x g F x and F x l P x s л.ˆˆˆÄ As a special case of Theorem 3.3, we have the following result which includes corresponding results in the literature as a special case. THEOREM 3.4. Let the strategic set X be a nonempty compact and con¨ex set in a Hausdorff locally topological¨ector space and let F, P: X ª 2 X be two set-¨alued mappings such that Ž .
i the constraint mapping F is upper semicontinuous with nonempty closed and con¨ex¨alues;
iii the domain of the mapping F l P is open in X.
Ž . Ž . Ž . Then there exists a point x g K such that x g F x and F x l P x s л.ˆˆˆÔ ur goal is to establish the general existence of equilibria for any Ž . Ž . number countable or uncountable players resp., agents without lower semicontinuity; as an application of Theorem 2.3 we first have the follow-Ž . ing existence of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract economy in topological vector spaces in which the constraint mapping A has i compactly open inverse for each i g I.
Ž
. Ž THEOREM 3.5. Let G G s X , A , B , P be a generalized game resp.,
. abstract economy , where I is any countable or uncountable set of players. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each i g I:
i the strategic set X is a nonempty con¨ex subset of a topological ï ector space;
Ž . Ž . ii for each x g X, the constraint mapping A x is nonempty and i Ž .
Ž . y1 Ž . co A x ; B x , and A has compactly open in¨erse; i.e., the set A y s
iii the preference mapping P : X ª 2 is such that the mapping
family A l P satisfies the noncompact condition;
i ii g I i.e., there exist a nonempty compact con¨ex subset X of X and a non-0 empty compact subset K of X such that, for each y g X _ K, there is an x g Ž Ä 4. Ž Ž Ž . . co X j y with x g co A y l P y for all i g I.
Ž . Then there exists x g X such that x g B x and A x l P x s л for each
Ž .4 Proof. For each i g I, let F s x g X: x g B x . Then the set F is
Ž .
i i w x By following the same proof as that of Theorem 3 from Ding and Tan 5 Ž . Ž . and conditions ii ᎐ v , we can show that the qualitative game ⌫ s Ž . Ž . X , Q satisfies the following properties: a the preference mapping
Ž . Ä 4 i nt x g X: P x / л ; and c the family Q satisfies the noncompact
Condition C ; i.e., there exist a nonempty compact convex subset X of X 0 and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each y g X _ K, Ž Ä 4. Ž. there is an x g co X j y with x g co P y for all i g I.
w x ments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 3 in Ding and Tan 5 , we can also show that the mapping Q is L L-majorized by using properties Ž .
Ž . Ž . a and b of the qualitative game ⌫ s X , Q above. By the noncomi i ig I pact condition, it follows that all hypotheses of Theorem 2.3 are satisfied. By Theorem 2.3, it follows that there exists a point x g K such that Ž . Ž . Q x s л, which implies that Q x s л for all i g I. Since, for each i Ž .
Ž . Ž . x g X, A x / л, therefore we must have that x g B x and A x l
In what follows, by Tulcea's approximation theorems for upper semicontinuous set-valued mappings in locally convex topological vector spaces, we will establish one general existence theorem of equilibria for abstract economies in which the constraint mappings are upper semicontinuous in locally convex topological vector spaces. Our result generalizes many results Now we have the following main existence theorem for equilibria without the assumption on lower semicontinuity for the preference mappings and in which the constraint mappings are only upper semicontinuous.
Ž
. THEOREM 3.6. Let ⌫ s X ; F ; P be a generalized game such that X i i i ig I Ž . is paracompact and each X has property K , where I may be an uncountable i set of players. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each i g I:
i the strategic set X is a nonempty closed con¨ex set in a Hausdorff i locally topological¨ector space;
ii the constraint mapping F is compact and upper semicontinuous i with nonempty closed and con¨ex¨alues;
X i
Ž . v there exist a nonempty compact and con¨ex subset X and a 0 nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, there exists Ž . Ž Ä 4. Ž Ž . Ž .. y s y g co X j x such that y g Fco F x l P x for all i g I.
Then ⌫ has an equilibrium x in K; i.e., there exists x g K such that x g F xˆˆî i Ž .
Ž . and F x l P x s л for all i g I.î i Proof. By Lemma 3.1, there is a common filtering set J such that, for Ž . every i g I, there exists a family F of regular correspondences i j jg J Ž . Ž . between X and X , such that both F and F are upper i i j j g J i j j g J approximating families for F . Note that E is paracompact and F l P is i i i i L L-majorized on E from E to X . By Theorem 2.1, it follows that there
. and x f co x for all x g X and b
y is compactly open in X for i i i each y g X . For each j g J, define a set-valued mapping : X ª 2 X i by
for each x g X. Note that F is regular; it follows that F has an open i j i j graph and thus the mapping is of class L L. Second, for each i g I, the
open in X. Therefore the game ⌫ s X ; F , F , satisfies all hyj i i j i j i j ig I potheses of Theorem 3.5. It follows by Theorem 3.5 that ⌫ has an j j j j j j Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . equilibrium x g K such that F x l x s л, and x g F xˆˆˆî
On the other hand, note that x is a net in thê j g J Ž j . compact set K; without loss of generality, we may assume that x j g J converges to x* g K. Then, for each i g I, x U s lim
Ž . is an upper approximation family for F , it follows that
for each x g X so that x*, x g Graph F . Therefore, for each i g I,
Ž . F x* l P x* s л and x* g F x* and this completes the proof. 
iii the mapping F l P is L L-majorized; We first note that the assumption X is metrizable in Theorem 3.8 is equivalent to saying that ''the index set I is countable and X is metrizable for each i g I.'' i w x In a recent paper by Zhou 26 , he also proves some existence theorems of equilibria for generalized games by assuming that constraint mappings Ž . have upper semicontinuity plus they also satisfy so-called ⑀-CS and CSproperties which look somehow like variant versions of fixed point free property for set-valued mappings; and in this way, a further generalization, Ž . w x the so-called LSC -property, has been introduced by Zheng 25 . In general, these properties are not easy to verify. However, our Theorems w x 3.7 and 3.8 generalize the corresponding Corollary 1 of Zhou 26 in the following ways: that the strategic sets may not be compact and the set of Ž . players resp., agents may not be countable.
As compact versions of both Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.8, we have the following corollaries. Ž . Ž . Ž . Then ⌫ has an equilibrium x in K such that x g F x and F x l P x s лˆˆˆî Ž .
ii the constraint mapping F is upper semicontinuous with nonempty i closed and con¨ex¨alues;
iii the mapping F l P is L L-majorized;
Ž . Then ⌫ has an equilibrium x in K such that x g F x and F x l P x s лˆˆˆî i i i for all i g I.
Finally, as a special case of Theorem 3.6, we have the following famous Fan᎐Glicksberg fixed point theorem. COROLLARY 3.11 . Let X be a nonempty compact con¨ex set in a Hausdorff locally topological¨ector space and let F: X ª 2 X be an upper semicontinuous set-¨alued mapping with nonempty closed¨alues. Then F has at least one fixed point in X. X Ž . Proof. Define P: X ª 2 by P x s л for each x g X. Then the conclusion follows from Theorem 3.6.
Finally we note that Theorems 3.6 and 3.7 show that the corresponding w x Ž existence results of equilibria for generalized games due to Zhou 26 e.g., .
Ž . see Corollary 1 still hold when the set of players resp., agents is Ž . uncountable instead of countable and the strategic resp., commodity spaces may not be compact; however, we need one extra hypothesis, Ž so-called paracompactness of course this hypothesis is automatically satis-. fied when the space X is metrizable , but we do not know whether the Ž . conclusion of Theorem 3.6 resp., Theorem 3.7 still holds without the Ž . paracompact hypothesis on the set E for each i g I in condition iv . i We also note that by using Michael type continuous selection theorems and their generalized versions plus the Himmelberg fixed point theorem in w x 10 , which is a different approach compared with approximate method w x w x used in this paper and by Tulcea 18 and Tan and Yuan 15 , some Ž . existence of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract economics w x w x w x have been established by Kim and Lee 12 , Wu 19 , Wu and Shen 20 , w x w x Zheng 25 , and Zhou 26 ; however, the shortage or their methods is that, in general, it needs to assume that either constraint andror preference mappings have lower semicontinuity or even stronger hypotheses such as having lower open sections.
